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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC COMPANY and
HOME INSURANCE C01 1PANY,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 15791

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COM1'1ISSION OF UTAH
and MICHAEL E. INSKEEP,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE 48-HOUR PERIOD WITHIN WHICH AN EMPLOYEE, CLAIMING TO HAVE
SUFFERED INJURY IN THE SERVICE OF HIS PIPLOYER, ~1UST GIVE
NOTICE TO HIS EMPLOYER OF THE TIME AND PLACE WHERE THE ACCIDENT
AND INJURY OCCURRED AND THF. NATURE OF THE SAME BEGINS TO RUN
WHEN THE EMPLOYEE FIRST GAINS KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCIDENT AND
INJURY.
Defendant Inskeep claims that the 48-hour notice period
set forth in Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended, should run from the time the employee first gains
knowledge that he may have a comuensable injury arising out of
the accident.

In support of his claim, he cites the case of

Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 436, 140 P.2d
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644 (1943).

However, the Salt Lake City case clearly does not

stand for such a proposition.

In fact, a careful reading of

the Salt Lake City case reveals that the Court there refused
to define an injury as one that is compensable, as suggested

i

by defendant Inskeep.

There, the defendant, while playing hand-I

ball in the course of his employment

with plaintiff Salt Lake i

City, was struck in the eye by a handball.

Although the injun;

obstensibly healed, his vision later began to become impaired.
Approximately 14 months after the accident, he sought medical
help and was informed that his eye would have to be removed
because it had developed a sarcoma of the choroid.

The de-

fendant filed a claim with the Industrial Commission, and it
held that his injury, including the loss of his eye as a result of the sarcoma, was compensable.

The plaintiff, Salt

Lake City, filed a petition for writ of review, wherein it
alleged that the defendant's claim was barred because he
failed to give it notice of the accident and injury within one
year from the date of the accident.

The court held that Salt

Lake City had received notice of the accident and injury througn
the defendant's supervisor, who was playing handball with him
at the time of the accident and injury.

Salt Lake City then

argued that the notice given was insufficient.

In response,

the court stated:
In so contending it (Salt Lake City) urges
that the statute uses the term "injury" to
mean an injury which has resulted from a
disability which will entitle the employee to
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compensation. Under such a construction of
t~e section the emnloyee would be required,
within a year from the date of the accident
to give his emnloyer notice of the accident'
and also notice that this accident had resulted in an injury which had caused a compensable disability. Often accidental injuries do not result in disability within a
year. It thus becomes evident that what the
City is really contending is that Section
42-1-92 limits comnensation to those accidental injuries which result within a year in
disability. Those injuries which do not
result in loss of work, require medical
attention, etc., until more than a year after
the date of the accident would, under this
construction, be excluded from the scope of
the Act.
This section, however, cannot be so construed.
We find no cases, and none are cited, which
have given such a construction to statutes
requiring the employee to give the employer
notice of the accident and injury within a
prescribed period of time. But quite to the
contrary the cases uniformly hold that such
statutes were designed to give the employer
an opportunity to ~ake an early investigation
of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
accident and to insure hi~ the opportunity of
giving prornnt and uroner medical care where
it is deemed necessary. Such statutes also
protect employers against fraudulent claims
and give them an opportunity to remedy defects so as to prevent similar accidents in
the future.
(Cases cited)
We have held that the Industrial Act ~ust be
liberally construed and that by such construction we should attemut to effectuate its beneficient and humane objects.
(Case cited)
We therefore will not construe this provision,
which was obviously designed to protect employers by requiring nrompt notice of injuries
and accidents, as a limitation on the scope
and coverage of the Act. The plain language
of the Act re uires onl notice of the "accient an injury." Ernp asis a
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In the Salt Lake City case, the plaintiff, Salt
Lake City, asked the Court to define the term "injury", for
Workmen's Compensation purposes, to mean an injury which
has resulted in a disability which will entitle an employee
to compensation.

The Court refused to accede to its

request, and such refusal resulted in a holding that an
injured employee need not, within one year, notify his employer that his injury may be compensable as well as notify
it of the accident and the injury itself.
In the case at bar, defendant Inskeep has asked the
Court to define the term "injury" as a compensable injury.

His

requested definition is clearly similar to that proposed by
Salt Lake City in the Salt Lake City case. Here, as there,
the Court should reject such a definition for the following
reasons.
First, in the Salt Lake City case, the Court refused to accept Salt Lake City's requested definition of the
term "injury" because such would not effectuate the beneficient
and humane objects of the Industrial Act.

In the case at

bar, were defendant Inskeep's requested similar definition
of the term "injury" accepted by the Court, an injured employee
would not have to report an accident and injury until such
time as, in his mind, it became compensable.

As a practical

matter, such realization could occur at any time after the
occurrence of an accident and injury, and the employee would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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then merely have to notify his employer of the accident and
injury or report to it for medical treatment within 48 hours
of such realization, provided that his claim was not otherwise
barred.

Of course, such could effectively thwart the purpose

and intent of Section 35-1-99 and the beneficient and humane
objects of the Workmen's Compensation Act, inasmuch as it
could possibly deny an injured employee the benefit of prompt
and competent medical care and may also effectively prevent
his employer from making early investigation so as to foreclose
fraudulent claims and from remedying any defects or problems
that may have caused or contributed to the employee's accident and injury.

Further, it would effectively gut the

48-hour notice requirement contained in Section 35-1-99
inasmuch as the employee could decide, as a practical matter,
the time at which the 48-hour notice period could commence.
The case at bar illustrates the disservice which
could result to workingmen generally were the 48-hour notice
period to commence when an injured employee decides that his
injury is compensable.

Defendant Inskeep, at page 3 of his

brief, states that he "testified that initially he felt his
back was strained and that he could continue to work given
medication and self-imposed exercise."

At page 5 of his

brief, we learn that, not only did he take self-imposed exercise, but he "took Bufferin pursuant to prior instructions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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received from Dr. Carson as a remedy to a prior strain."
Consequently, he concludes that, inasmuch as he treated himself, he received medical treatment within 48 hours of the
accident and injury.

It is respectfully submitted that the

48-hour notice period was designed, among other purposes, to
reduce and eventually erradicate such self-treatment.

Had

defendant Inskeep reported the accident and injury to nlaintiff Interstate Electric Company or reported to it for medical
treatment as soon as he knew he had strained his back, he
likely would have been told to leave work and immediately seek
licensed medical advice.

Instead, he elected, having con-

sulted with himself, to continue to work for another week,
certainly aggravating the sprain and damage which occurred
to his back as a result of the accident.

Consequently,

throo~

his failure to notify plaintiff Interstate Electric Company

I

of his accident and injury or report to it for medical treatment with 48 hours of the accident and injury, defendant Inskeep probably aggravated his injuries.

Had he thought that

he would lose 15% of any award which he may ultimately receive as a result of his accident and injury if he did not so
report, he probably would have reported his accident and injury to plaintiff Interstate Electric Company immediately,
thereby minimizing the aggravation and damage that occurred
before he was told by Dr. Beck to cease working, and minimizing the prejudice that probably resulted to plaintiff In· al
terstate Electric Company through payment of avoidable me d ic

expenses.
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Hence, the 48-hour notice requirement and attendant
reduction of award for failure of an injured employee to
comply with it was instituted by the Legislature in oart in
an attempt to encourage an injured employee to seek early
medical help and enable employers to mitigate the expense
and damages of injuries which otherwise might be aggravated
or avoided.

If the 48-hour notice period is deemed to commence,

as is suggested by defendant Inskeep, when an employee first
realizes that a compensable injury might arise from an accident, emuloyees generally may be without sufficient motivation to help themselves or allow their employers to help
them under circumstances wherein the injured employee takes
it upon himself to diagnose and treat his own injury or continue to work notwithstanding it.
Second, even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the
48-hour notice period runs, as suggested by defendant Inskeep,
from the time an employee first realizes that he may have a
compensable injury arising out of an accident, he offered,
at the hearing of this matter, no evidence as to when he
first knew that his injury was comuensable.

Clearly, the

burden of proof in this regard was his, according to the
case of i.vherri tt vs. Industrial Commission, 100 Utah 68, 110
P.2d 374 (1941), quoted in plaintiffs' initial brief filed
in this matter.

Also, at the hearing of this matter, he of-

fered no testimony or other evidence
that such burden was met.

which could indicate

Further, at rage 3 of his brief,
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defendant Inskeep states that on September 9, 1976, he requested that his wife obtain an appointment from Dr. Beck.
As a result, he concludes that "he may have gained knowledge
on or about September 9, 1976 that a compensable injury was
possible in this matter

"

(Emphasis added)

Consequently, defendant Inskeep admits that he does
not know when he first gained knowledge that his injury may
be conpensable or whether such knowledge came to him within
48 hours of the time he reported the accident and injury to
his supervisor.
POINT I I
DEFENDANT INSKEEP HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS FAILURE TO NOTIFY
PLAINTIFF INTERSTATE ELECTRIC COMPANY OF THE ACCIDENT AND
INJURY OR TO REPORT TO IT FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT WITHIN 48
HOURS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ACCIDENT AND INJURY WAS NOT
INTENDED TO MISLEAD OR PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF INTERSTATE ELECTRIC COMPANY AND DID NOT IN FACT MISLEAD OR PREJUDICE IT.
Defendant Inskeep claims that, upon failure of an
injured employee to notify his employer of an accident and
injury or report to his employer for medical treatment within
48 hours of the accident and injury, the employer must show
that such delay was prejudicial before the statutory provision for a 15% reduction in benefits becomes operable.

In

support of his claim, he argues that the facts which may
indicate such prejudice are solely within the knowledge
of the employer.
facts

However, it is clear that many of such

are solely within the knowledge of the employee.

For
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example, an injured employee may know whether there were any
witnesses to the accident which resulted in his injury.

Were

the employer unable to locate and interview such witnesses,
it is possible that it could be prejudiced in its defense
of a claim; especially so were the claim of a fraudulent
nature.

However, in such

an instance, the knowledge of such

prejudice would be solely within the
ee.

province of the employ-

As another example, an injured employee may know, through

consultation with his treating physician, that, had he seen
his physician or other medical personnel within the 48-hour
notice rather than after it, or had he not worked under circumstances wherein medically he should not have, the aggravation of his injuries would have been substantially less.

The

employer may not have access to such information and, consequently, could be nrejudiced through payment of medical expenses which could have been otherwise mitigated.
such knowledge may be exclusively within the

However,

province of

the employee.
In an attempt to further support his claim that
plaintiff Interstate Electric Company has the burden of showing that it was prejudiced through his failure to notify it
of the accident and injury or

report to it for medical treat-

ment within 48 hours of the accident and injury, defendant
Inskeep cites the cases of Prager v. Lakeridge Theater, 484
P.2d 404 (Colo. App. 1971), Fukuda v. Peerless Roofing Company,
Ltd., 523 P.2d 832 (Hawaii 1974), and Phillips v. Helms, Inc.,
439 P.2d 119 (Kan. 1968).
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The Prager case cannot be found at the cited location or in.the cited volume.

Consequently, while it has

probably been miscited through inadvertence, it does not
lend weight to the contention of defendant Inskeep under
circumstances where it cannot he read.

In the Fukuda case,

also cited by defendant Inskeep, the Supreme Court of Hawaii
held that, once an injured employee has demonstrated a
satisfactory reason explaining his failure to report as required by statute, the burden of showing that such delay
resulted in prejudice to the employer shifts to the employer.
However, the statute upon which the court's holding is based
differs from Section 35-1-99.

Further, even if the Hawaiian

court's construction of its own statute were given weight

in the case at bar, defendant Inskeep failed, during the course
of the hearing of this matter, to offer evidence indicating
that he had satisfactory reasons for his failure to report
the accident and injury to plaintiff Interstate Electric
Company or report to it for medical treatment within 48 hours
of the occurrence of the accident and injury.
I

Nor does the case of Phillips v. Helms, Inc.

lend

support to defendant Inskeep's contention that plaintiff Interstate Electric Company has the burden of showing that it
was prejudiced through his failure to notify it of the
accident and injury or report to it within 48 hours of the
accident and injury.

There, while the court held that the

employer had the burden of showing that it was prejudiced bv
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the injured employee's failure to give timely notice of his
accident and injury, its holding was based

u~on

a Kansas

statute which specifically placed such a burden upon the
employer.

Inasmuch as Section 35-1-99 contains no provision

for the allocation of the burden of proof with regard to
the prejudice which may result to an employer as a result
of an employee's failure to timely notify it of his accident and injury or report to it for medical

treatmen~,

the

Phillius case is clearly not persuasive or in point.
Section 35-1-99 provides that, under circumstances
where an injured employee fails to notify his employer of
the accident and injury or report to it for medical treatment within 48 hours, the compensation otherwise provided him
by the Workmen's Compensation Act shall not be reduced 15%
unless (1) his employer was not mislead or prejudiced by such
failure, and (2) such emnlovee did not intend to mislead or
prejudice his employer in making a defense.
Defendant Inskeep claims that plaintiff Interstate
Electric Company has the burden of showing that it was prejudiced in order for the statutory provision for a 15%
reduction in benefits to become operable.

As indicated earl-

ier in the plaintiff's initial brief, the burden of proof
in that regard is, according to the general rule, upon the
employee.
However, even if it is assumed, arguendo, that
such burden is upon plaintiff Interstate Electric Company
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and that it has failed to meet it, the burden of showing
that he did not intend to mislead or prejudice plaintiff
Interstate Electric Company in its defense is upon defendant
Inskeep.

Clearly, no one but him could know whether his

failure to comply with the notice requirements of Section
35-1-99 was or was not intended to mislead or prejudice
plaintiff Interstate Electric Company in its defense. Further, according to the general rule, as indicated in nlaintiffs'
initial brief, such burden is upon defendant Inskeep.

Not-

withstanding, defendant Inskeep did not raise or discuss
the issue in his brief.

The reason for such failure is

clear -- there is no evidence in the record which indicates
or even intimates that defendant Inskeep has even tried to
meet his burden in this regard, much less actually meet it.
Consequently, even if it is assumed

that plaintiff Inter-

state Electric Company must shoulder the burden of showing
that it was prejudiced by the failure of defendant Inskeep
to comply with the notice requirements of Section 35-1-99,
and that it had failed to meet such burden, defendant Inskeep must, in order to avoid a 15% reduction in benefits,
show that he did not intend to mislead or prejudice plaintiff Interstate Electric Company through such failure.

The

statutory language of Section 35-1-99 is clear -- in order
for an employee, who has failed to notify his employer of
his accident and injury or report to it for medical treatment
within the prescribed period, to avoid a 15% reduction in
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benefits, it must be shown that his employer was not in
fact prejudiced thereby and that the injured employee did not
intend to mislead or prejudice his employer in making a
defense.
Consequently, since defendant Inskeep has failed
to offer evidence which would indicate that he did not
intend to mislead or prejudice plaintiff Interstate Electric
Companv through his failure to comply with the notice requirements of Section 35-1-99, his award, according to its terms,
must be reduced 15%.
SUMMARY
It is respectfully submitted that the 48-hour period
within which defendant Inskeep was required to notify plaintiff Interstate Electric Comnanv or report to it for medical
treat began to run upon the occurrence of his accident and
injury.

Inasmuch as defendant Inskeep failed to comply with

such statutory provisions, he must show, in order to avoid
a 15% reduction in the benefits to which he would otherwise
be entitled, (1) that plaintiff Interstate Electric Company
was not prejudiced by such failure, and (2) that he did not
intend to mislead or prejudice plaintiff Interstate Electric
Company in its defense.

He has failed to meet either such

burden and consequently, the award of the Industrial Commission
must be vacated insofar as it fails to reduce the award of
defendant Inskeep by 15%, as nrovided by Section 35-1-99,
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